Question by lilcuteshihtzu: what were queen elizabeth I's three major policies? what were the effects of her policies?
were her major policies increasing overseas trade, expanding english navy and sponsoring voyages of discovery?
Answer by bearstirringfromcave
Queen Elizabeth the First was mainly concerned with maintaining Englands Independence against foreign threats and that meant strengthening the Anglican Church which resulted in harsh treatment for Catholics and dissidents of all sorts. Elizabeth was concerned with expanding trade, increasing the production of wool, encouraging the manufacter of woolen goods, and finding new markets for wool. This meant more trade with Russia because if anyone needed wool it was the Russians.
Elizabeth encouraged the English Navy but was parsiminous when it came to providing funds. Mostly her support was 'moral' aan odd word because what Elizabeth did was make it clear that she would not get upset if intrepid adventurers plundered Spanish ports & ships.
It is late and whatever so links and a great article for ye....
"""The outlines of her foreign policy are sketched elsewhere, and her courtships were diplomatic. Contemporary gossip said that she was debarred from matrimony by a physical defect; and her cry when she heard that Mary queen of Scots had given birth to a son is the most womanly thing recorded of Elizabeth. Her features were as handsome as Mary's, but she had little fascination, and in spite of her many suitors no man lost his head over Elizabeth as men did over Mary. She was far too 'masculine' in mind and temperament, and her extravagant addiction to the outward trappings of femininity was probably due to the absence or atrophy of deeper feminine instincts. In the same way the impossibility of marriage made her all the freer with her flirtations, and she carried some of them to lengths that scandalized a public unconscious of Elizabeth's security. She had every reason to keep them in the dark, and to convince other courts that she could and would marry if the provocation were sufficient. She could not marry Philip II, but she held out hopes to more than one of his Austrian cousins whenever France or Mary Stuart seemed to threaten; and later she encouraged two French princes when Philip had lost patience with Elizabeth and made Mary Stuart his protegee. Her other suitors were less important, except Leicester, who appealed to the least intellectual side of Elizabeth and was always a cause of distraction in her policy and her ministers.
Elizabeth was terribly handicapped by having no heirs of her body and no obvious English successor. She could not afford to recognize Mary's claim, for that would have been to alienate the Protestants, double the number of Catholics, and, in her own phrase, to spread a winding-sheet before her eyes; for all would have turned to the rising sun. Mary was dangerous enough as it was, and no one would willingly make his rival his heir. Elizabeth could hardly be expected to go out of her way and ask parliament to repeal its own acts for Mary's sake; probably it would have refused. Nor was it personal enmity on Elizabeth's part that brought Mary to the block. Parliament had long been ferociously demanding Mary's execution, not because she was guilty but because she was dangerous to the public peace. She alone could have given the Spanish Armada any real chance of success; and as the prospect of invasion loomed larger on the horizon, fiercer grew the popular determination to remove the only possible centre of a domestic rising, without which the external attack was bound to be a failure. Elizabeth resisted the demand, not from compassion or qualms of conscience, but because she dreaded the responsibility for Mary's death. She wished Paulet would manage the business on his own account, and when at last her signature was extorted she made a scapegoat of her secretary Davison who had the warrant executed.
The other great difficulty, apart from the succession, with which Elizabeth had to deal, arose from the exuberant aggressiveness of England, which she could not, and perhaps did not want to, repress. Religion was not really the cause of her external dangers, for the time had passed for crusades, and no foreign power seriously contemplated an armed invasion of England for religion's sake. But no state could long tolerate the affronts which English seamen offered Spain. The common view that the British Empire has been won by purely defensive action is not tenable, and from the beginning of her reign Englishmen had taken the offensive, partly from religious but also from other motives. They were determined to break up the Spanish monopoly in the new world, and in the pursuit of this endeavour they were led to challenge Spain in the old. For nearly thirty years Philip put up with the capture of his treasure-ships, the raiding of his colonies and the open assistance rendered to his rebels. Only when he had reached the conclusion that his power would never be secure in the Netherlands or the New World until England was conquered, did he despatch the Spanish Armada. Elizabeth delayed the breach as long as she could, probably because she knew that war meant taxation, and that taxation was the most prolific parent of revolt.
With the defeat of the Spanish Armada Elizabeth's work was done, and during the last fifteen years of her reign she got more out of touch with her people. That period was one of gradual transition to the conditions of Stuart times; during it practically every claim was put forward that was made under the first two Stuarts either on behalf of parliament or the prerogative, and Elizabeth's attitude towards the Puritans was hardly distinguishable from James I's. But her past was in her favour, and so were her sex and her Tudor tact, which checked the growth of discontent and made Essex's rebellion a ridiculous fiasco. He was the last and the most wilful but perhaps the best of her favourites, and his tragic fate deepened the gloom of her closing years. The loneliness of a queen who had no husband or children and no relatives to mention must at all times have been oppressive; it grew desolating in old age after the deaths of Leicester, Walsingham, Burghley and Essex, and Elizabeth died, the last of her race, on the 24th of March 1603. """
"""Elizabeth did have a coherent foreign policy of her own, a policy shaped by the unusual conditions of her reign. These were less to do with her sex, a much-exaggerated issue, than her questionable legitimacy and the coincidence that the leading members of the wider Tudor royal family were Scots. Relations within the royal family, whether among immediate siblings or all those with a claim to the throne, are the key to the politics of the monarchies of late-medieval and early-modern Europe. Rivalries within the royal family lay at the heart of English politics between the reigns of Edward III (1327-77) and Henry VII (1485-1509), not least the Wars of the Roses. This was also the case in France and Scotland in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Habsburgs provide the exception: with only a few lapses, they were almost the model of family loyalty.
The Wars of the Roses effectively destroyed the male members of the House of Lancaster (the descendants of John of Gaunt) and Henry VII and Henry VIII completed the process. By Edward VI's death in 1553 all the main claimants to the English crown were women, and such men as had a claim owed it to a female descent. This was the case with Henry VII himself, and moreover his mother (Lady Margaret Beaufort) was descended from John of Gaunt's illegitimate family.
In Elizabeth's case the taint of illegitimacy was compounded. This was due to the circumstances of her mother's fall as much as the 'divorce' of Catherine of Aragon. It has been argued that she was actually illegitimate on five counts. If Anne Boleyn was as promiscuous as was charged, then Henry VIII's paternity was in doubt, the source of the later snide comment that Elizabeth looked like Mark Smeaton, the musician executed as one of Anne's lovers.
Illegitimacy was used to justify the removal of Elizabeth and Mary from the succession in Edward VI's settlement of the crown on Lady Jane Grey in 1553. This was of major significance. If the events of 1553 united Mary and Elizabeth in common defence of their rights as heirs to Henry VIII, they also brought the Queen of Scots to the fore as a rival to both. The basis of Mary Stuart's claim from this point on was that she was the one descendent of Henry VII untainted by either illegitimacy or heresy. Yet in two important respects Mary Stuart and Elizabeth also shared common interests. As an heir of Henry VII, Mary could not challenge the legitimacy of the Tudor line as a whole. If Gaunt's wider descendants were taken into account, then, as several contemporary commentators noted, Philip of Spain had a strong claim as descendant of the legitimate daughters of Gaunt's second marriage. Secondly, as a woman Mary could not query Elizabeth's right to the crown on grounds of sex. In fact, Catholics never repudiated Elizabeth on sexual grounds.
The events of 1553 made Elizabeth's place in the succession an international issue. The extent of her involvement with the French embassy prior to Wyatt's Rebellion of 1554, if any, remains unclear, but thereafter the French claimed to be her friends. A decade later the French ambassador recalled Elizabeth approaching him about fleeing to France in the spring of 1557, and warning her against it as she might forfeit her place in the succession as a result. On the other hand, it was to Philip that she owed her release from Woodstock in the spring of 1555. But Elizabeth deliberately concealed her appeals to Philip and refused on the eve of her accession to acknowledge any debt of gratitude to him, the source of considerable resentment in Spanish circles at the time and later.
Elizabeth's ability to turn to France on her accession was hampered by Mary Stuart's position as Dauphine and, after July 1559, Queen of France. Until her death in 1587, Mary was the pole around which Elizabeth's foreign policy revolved. The threat of Mary's rival claim to the throne was the decisive motive for Elizabeth's interventions in Scotland in 1560 and in France in 1562, the latter based on the argument advanced by Sir William Cecil that a Guise victory in France in 1562 would be the first stage in a plan to install Mary in England. In 1560 Elizabeth scored a crucial success in the creation of an Anglophile government in Scotland and in Mary's apparent renunciation of her rival claim in the treaty of Edinburgh. However, this was countered by Mary's refusal to ratify the treaty and then her return to Scotland in 1561 following the death of Francis II in December 1560.
If Mary's return to Britain threatened to destabilise the status quo, it also created an opportunity for the two to reach a personal agreement. As Elizabeth admitted to William Maitland of Lethington in September 1561, 'sche [Mary] is of the blude of Ingland, my cousing and nixt kynnswoman, so that nature must bind me to luif hir dewlie'. Such an agreement was the aim of the famous meeting proposed for the summer of 1562, which Elizabeth had first offered in the previous summer in exchange for ratification. The reasons for its postponement were many, but Elizabeth's interest in it was genuine, and it was to resurface on several occasions in the next few years. On the surface a stalemate was reached in 1561 over Elizabeth's insistence on ratification of the treaty of Edinburgh as a gesture of good faith, and Mary's offer of exchanging renunciation of her rival claim for recognition as heir apparent. Elizabeth's manoeuvring room was limited, apart from threats to marry. If, as must be accepted, she had no serious intention of marrying, then the further succession would not be of her body. There is no evidence that she ever regarded anyone other than Mary as her successor. Except for a few tactical gestures she never showed any sympathy for the rival claim of Lady Katherine Grey, nor did she treat her cousins on her mother's side (the Careys and the Knollys), though close to her, as of royal rank.
However, the will of Henry VIII, which passed over the Stuarts in favour of the Grey line, presented major difficulties, not least because Elizabeth had fully accepted it as genuine when she appealed to the surviving executors to protect her when she was imprisoned in 1554. It was to circumvent these difficulties that Elizabeth tried to prevent the succession being debated in Parliament in 1563 and 1566 and at the same time suggested a way in which Mary could be integrated more fully into the English royal family. This was to make a friendly second marriage, and in particular to marry the Earl of Leicester and reside with him in the English court. This proposal has been so often derided as absurd or insulting that the logic of 'domesticating' Mary has been overlooked. The same applies to Elizabeth's later proposals that the young James VI should be brought up and educated in England, not simply to prevent him being transported elsewhere (which was certainly a serious worry) but to integrate him as well."""""""""""
Peace... /// ------O i O ------ \
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